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ABSTRACT
Adversarial training, in which a network is trained on both adversarial and clean
examples, is one of the most trusted defense methods against adversarial attacks.
However, there are three major practical difficulties in implementing and deploying
this method - expensive in terms of extra memory and computation costs; accu-
racy trade-off between clean and adversarial examples; and lack of diversity of
adversarial perturbations. Classical adversarial training uses fixed, precomputed
perturbations in adversarial examples (input space). In contrast, we introduce
dynamic adversarial perturbations into the parameter space of the network, by
adding perturbation biases to the fully connected layers of deep convolutional
neural network. During training, using only clean images, the perturbation biases
are updated in the Fast Gradient Sign Direction to automatically create and store
adversarial perturbations by recycling the gradient information computed. The
network learns and adjusts itself automatically to these learned adversarial pertur-
bations. Thus, we can achieve adversarial training with negligible cost compared
to requiring a training set of adversarial example images. In addition, if combined
with classical adversarial training, our perturbation biases can alleviate accuracy
trade-off difficulties, and diversify adversarial perturbations.
1 INTRODUCTION
Neural networks have lead to a series of breakthroughs in many fields, such as image classification
tasks (He et al., 2016), natural language processing (Devlin et al., 2018). Model performance on
clean examples was the main evaluation criterion for these applications until the realization of the
adversarial example phenomenon by Szegedy et al. (2013); Biggio et al. (2013). Neural networks
were shown to be vulnerable to adversarial perturbations: carefully computed small perturbations
added to legitimate clean examples (adversarial examples, Fig. 1a) can cause misclassification on
state-of-the-art machine learning models. Thus, building a deep learning system that is robust to both
adversarial examples and clean examples has emerged as a critical requirement.
Researchers have proposed a number of adversarial defense strategies to increase the robustness
of a deep learning system. Adversarial training, in which a network is trained on both adversarial
examples (xadv) and clean examples (xcln) with true class labels y, is one of the few defenses
against adversarial attacks that withstands strong attacks. Adversarial examples are the summation
of adversarial perturbations lying inside the input space (δI ) and clean examples: xadv = xcln + δI
(Fig. 1a). Given a classifier with a classification loss function L and parameters θ, the objective
function of adversarial training is:
min
θ
L(xcln + δI , xcln, y; θ) (1)
For example, Goodfellow et al. (2014) used adversarial training and reduced the test set error rates
from 89.4% to 17.9% on adversarial examples of the MNIST dataset. Huang et al. (2015) built a
robust model against adversarial examples by punishing misclassified adversarial examples.
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Despite the efficacy of adversarial training in building a robust system, there are three major practical
difficulties while implementing and deploying this method. Difficulty one: adversarial training
is expensive in terms of memory and computation costs. Producing an adversarial example
requires multiple gradient computations. In a practical scenario, we further produce more than one
adversarial examples for each clean example (Tramèr et al., 2017). We need to at least double the
amount of memory, to store those adversarial examples alongside the clean examples. In addition,
during adversarial training, the network has to train on both clean and adversarial examples; hence,
adversarial training requires at least twice the computation power than just training on clean examples.
For example, even on reasonably-sized datasets, such as CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, adversarial
training can take multiple days on a single GPU. As a consequence, although adversarial training
remains among the most trusted defenses, it has only been within reach for research labs having
hundreds of GPUs [[[ref]]]. Difficulty two: accuracy trade-off between clean examples and
adversarial examples - although adversarial training can improve the robustness against adversarial
examples, it sometimes hurts accuracy on clean examples. There is an accuracy trade-off between
the adversarial examples and clean examples (Di et al., 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2019; Stanforth
et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019). Because most of the test data in real applications are clean examples,
test accuracy on clean examples should be as good as possible. Thus, this accuracy trade-off hinders
the practical usefulness of adversarial training because it often ends up lowering performance on
clean examples. Difficulty three: lack of diversity of adversarial perturbations - even though one
might have sufficient computation resources to train a network on both adversarial and clean examples,
it is unrealistic and expensive to introduce all unknown attack samples into the adversarial training.
For example, Tramèr et al. (2017) proposed Ensemble Adversarial Training which can increase
the diversity of adversarial perturbations in a training set by generating adversarial perturbations
transferred from other models (they won the competition on Defenses against Adversarial Attacks).
Thus, broad diversity of adversarial examples is crucial for adversarial training.
To solve the above three practical difficulties, we dive into details of adversarial training and analyze
the causes of these difficulties. The cause of difficulty one: In Fig. 1b, a classical deep convolutional
network is trained on both clean examples and adversarial examples during adversarial training.
Since the adversarial examples are the summation of clean examples and adversarial perturbations
(Fig. 1a), the adversarial training uses duplicate information from clean examples and the clean
portion of perturbed examples. If we could use information from clean examples only once and
generate corresponding adversarial perturbations during the training of clean examples, we could
reduce computation costs significantly. The cause of difficulty two: to reduce computation costs,
one might train the neural network on only adversarial examples. Since adversarial examples are the
summation of clean examples and adversarial perturbations, it contains overlapped information from
both clean examples and adversarial perturbations. However, failing to incorporate intact information
of clean examples hurts test accuracy on clean examples (Di et al., 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2019).
The cause of difficulty three: even though one might have sufficient computation resources and can
afford training on both clean and adversarial examples, the finite amount of adversarial examples still
limits the diversity of adversarial perturbations. Thus, the lack of diversity of adversarial perturbations
decreases test accuracy on both clean and adversarial examples (Tramèr et al., 2017).
Here, we introduce a new adversarial perturbation bias (δAP ) to the last few fully connected layers
of the deep convolutional network, replacing the normal bias term (Fig. 1c). The main novelty is that
instead of using a fixed, precomputed adversarial perturbations in adversarial examples (input space),
we introduce dynamic adversarial perturbations into the parameter space of the network, lying inside
the adversarial perturbation bias. During training on clean examples, the adversarial perturbation
bias automatically creates and stores adversarial perturbations by recycling the gradient information
computed and through updating using the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) Goodfellow et al.
(2014) with the objective function:
min
θ,δAP
L(xcln, y; θ, δAP ) (2)
Where xcln is a clean example with true class y, θ is the network parameters, δAP is adversarial
perturbation bias, andL is the classification loss function. Both adversarial perturbations in adversarial
examples and in adversarial perturbation biases are calculated using FGSM. The only difference
is that adversarial perturbations in adversarial examples lie inside the input space and adversarial
perturbations in adversarial perturbation bias lie inside the parameter space. Thus, the adversarial
perturbation biases play a role like adversarial examples in the input space, but they can inject the
learned adversarial perturbations directly to the network parameter space. Then, the network learns
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Figure 1: (a) Adversarial examples are a summation of clean examples and adversarial perturbations.
(b) Adversarial training for classical deep convolutional network model. Adversarial training on both
clean and adversarial examples requires two duplicate information from clean examples and one
information on adversarial perturbations. Thus, the adversarial training procedure is expensive. (c)
Solving the expensive training procedure. By introducing adversarial perturbation biases to the fully
connected layers of a deep convolutional network, we can achieve adversarial training with negligible
costs. While training only on clean examples, adversarial perturbation biases automatically create
and store adversarial perturbations by recycling the gradient information computed when updating
model parameters. The network learns and adjusts itself to these injected adversarial perturbations.
Thus, the adversarial perturbation bias increases the robustness against adversarial examples.
and adjusts itself automatically to these injected adversarial perturbations. Thus, it is a robust system
against adversarial attacks. During training only on clean examples, the network with adversarial
perturbation bias shows largely improved test accuracy on adversarial examples, with negligible extra
costs. In addition, during classical adversarial training combined with our approach, the network with
adversarial perturbation bias can alleviate the accuracy trade-off and diversify available adversarial
perturbations. To show the efficacy of the network with adversarial perturbation bias on the above
three difficulties, we consider three different scenarios that correspond to different abilities to access
increasing computation power.
3
2 RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Attack models and algorithms: Most of the attack models and algorithms focus on causing mis-
classification of target classifiers. They find an adversarial perturbation δI . Then, they create an
adversarial example by adding the adversarial perturbation to a clean example xcln: xadv = xcln+δI .
The adversarial perturbation sneaks the clean example xcln out of its natural class and into another.
Given a fixed classifier with parameters θ, a clean example xcln with true label y, and a classification
loss function L, the bounded non-targeted adversarial perturbation δI is computed by solving:
max
δI
L(xcln + δI , y; θ) , subject to ||δI ||p ≤  (3)
where ||.||p is some lp-norm distance metric, and  is the adversarial perturbation budget.
In this work, we consider the most popular non-targeted method - Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) by Goodfellow et al. (2014), in the context of l∞-bounded attacks: xadv = xcln +
 sign(∇xclnL(xcln, y, θ))
White box attack model: In white box attacks (Qiu et al., 2019), the adversaries have complete
knowledge about the target model, including algorithm, data distribution and model parameters. The
adversaries can generate adversarial perturbations by identifying the most vulnerable feature space of
the target model. In this work, we use white box Fast Gradient Sign Method with  = 0.3 to generate
adversarial perturbations.
Modification of bias terms: Modifying the structure of bias terms in the fully connected layer can
be beneficial. Wen & Itti (2019) used bias units to store the beneficial perturbations (opposite to the
well-known adversarial perturbations). Wen & Itti (2019) showed that the beneficial perturbations,
stored inside task-dependent bias units, can bias the network outputs toward the correct classification
region for each task, allowing a single neural network to have multiple input to output mappings.
Multiple input to output mappings alleviate the catastrophic forgetting problem (McCloskey & Cohen,
1989) in sequential learning scenarios (a previously learned mapping of an old task is erased during
learning of a new mapping for a new task). Here, we leverage a similar idea. During training on clean
examples, adversarial perturbation bias automatically creates and stores the adversarial perturbations.
The network automatically learns how to adjust to these adversarial perturbations. Thus, it helps us to
build a robust model against adversarial examples.
3 NETWORK STRUCTURE AND ALGORITHM FOR A NEURAL NETWORK WITH
ADVERSARIAL PERTURBATION BIAS.
Two different structures for adversarial perturbation bias: naive adversarial perturbation bias
and multimodal adversarial perturbation bias. Naive adversarial perturbation bias (δAP ) is just a
normal bias term of the fully connected layer. The only difference is that during backpropaga-
tion, we update the naive adversarial perturbation bias using the Fast Gradient Sign Method. For
multimodal adversarial perturbation bias, we design the multimodal adversarial perturbation bias
(δAP = mAPWAP ) as a product of bias memories (mAP ∈ R1×h) and bias weight (WAP ∈ Rh×n),
where n is the number of neurons in the fully connected layer, and h the number of bias memories.
Multimodal adversarial perturbation bias has more degrees of freedom to better fit a multimodal
distribution. Thus it could yield better results than the naive adversarial perturbation bias. The update
rules for the network with naive (blue) and multimodal (red) adversarial perturbation bias are shown
in Alg. 1 and Alg. 2.
Algorithm 1 Forward rules for both naive and multimodal adversarial perturbation bias
Input: Xactivations— Activations from the last layer
δAP— Adversarial perturbation bias
Output: Y =WXactivations+δAP , where: W— Normal neuron weights.
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Algorithm 2 Backward rules for naive and multimodal adversarial perturbation bias
Notations: W— Normal neuron weights Xactivations — Activations from the last layer
δAP — Adversarial perturbation bias (native or multimodal)
mAP — Bias memories for multimodal adversarial perturbation bias
WAP — Bias weights for multimodal adversarial perturbation bias
 — Adversarial perturbation budgets for Fast Gradient Sign Method
During the training:
Input: Grad — Gradients from the next layer
output: dW = Grad.dot(dXTactivations) // gradients for the normal neuron weights
dXactivations =W
T.dot(Grad) // gradients for activations to last layer
For naive adversarial perturbation bias:
dδAP = sign(
∑number of samples
n=1 Grad)
// gradients for the naive adversarial perturbation bias using FGSM
For multimodal adversarial perturbation bias:
dmAP =  sign (W
T
AP.dot(Grad)) // gradients for the bias memories of
multimodal adversarial perturbation bias using FGSM
dWAP = Grad.dot(m
T
AP)
// gradients for the bias weights of multimodal adversarial perturbation bias
After the training:
For multimodal adversarial perturbation bias:
Keep the δAP as the product of mAP and WAP
Delete mAP and WAP to reduce memory and parameter costs
4 THE FUNCTION OF ADVERSARIAL PERTURBATION BIAS IN THREE
DIFFERENT SCENARIOS
Scenario 1, adversarial training with negligible costs: a company with modest computation
resources can only afford training the network on clean examples, but still wants to have a moderately
robust system against adversarial examples. During training on clean examples, when updating model
parameters with objective function Eqn. 2, in the backward pass of backpropagation, adversarial
perturbation bias automatically creates and stores adversarial perturbations (calculated from clean
examples). In the forward pass, the adversarial perturbation bias injects the learned adversarial
perturbations to the network. As a result, the neural network learns the structure of these adversarial
perturbations and adjusts itself to against these injected adversarial perturbations automatically during
the training on clean examples. Although the network cannot be trained on the adversarial examples to
access the information of adversarial perturbations directly because of the modest computation power,
adversarial perturbation bias can still provide the information of adversarial perturbations to the
network. Thus, adversarial perturbation bias can improve the model’s robustness against adversarial
examples (see Results) and maintain the highest test accuracy on clean examples while barely
increase any computation costs. For naive adversarial perturbation bias, we do not introduce any extra
computation costs beyond FGSM. For multimodal adversarial perturbation, the extra computation
costs are further increased by a matrix multiplication in the forward pass and two dots products in
the backward pass per fully connected layer. The state-of-the-art deep convolutional structure might
have up to three fully connected layers as a classifier, yielding up to three extra multiplication and
six extra dot products computation costs. The extra computation costs are negligible comparing to
generating a huge amount of extra adversarial examples and training the neural network on both clean
and adversarial examples.
Scenario 2, counteracting the adversarial perturbations lying inside of the adversarial exam-
ples: to have strong robustness against adversarial examples, a company with moderate computation
resources can only afford to generate adversarial examples and train a network only on adversarial
examples. Training only on adversarial examples can achieve high robustness against adversarial
examples, but it decreases the test accuracy on the clean examples. During training on adversarial
examples, when updating model parameters, in the backward pass of backpropagation, adversarial
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perturbation bias automatically creates and stores adversarial perturbations (calculated from the
adversarial examples) by recycling the gradient information computed. In the forward pass, the
adversarial perturbation bias injects the learned adversarial perturbations to the network. There is a
high chance that the adversarial perturbations (δAP calculated from adversarial examples) lying inside
the parameter space of neural network (adversarial perturbation bias) would counteract the adversarial
perturbations (δI calculated from clean examples) lying inside the input space (images of adversarial
examples). In mathematical term, in the view of the network, xadv+ δAP = xcln+ δI + δAP ≈ xcln,
where δI counteract with the δAP . Adversarial perturbation bias can convert some adversarial exam-
ples into clean examples because of the counteraction. Thus, it largely improves the testing accuracy
on the clean examples (see Results), while it still maintains a high testing accuracy against adversarial
examples.
Scenario 3, diversify the adversarial perturbations: a company with abundant computation re-
sources can afford to train a network on both clean and adversarial examples. In the generation
of adversarial examples, the adversarial perturbations lying inside the adversarial examples are
calculated from the clean examples. In comparison, during the training of the network on both
clean and adversarial examples, in the backward pass, the adversarial perturbation bias creates and
stores adversarial perturbations calculated from both clean and adversarial images by recycling
the gradient information computed. This allows the adversarial perturbation bias to diversify the
available adversarial perturbations and to inject these varied adversarial perturbations to the network.
In addition, adversarial perturbations lying inside the adversarial examples are fixed and precomputed.
In addition, the adversarial perturbations lying inside the adversarial perturbation bias change dy-
namically for every training epoch. This further increases the variations of adversarial perturbations
during the training. In mathematical representation, the diversified group has: clean examples xcln,
adversarial examples xadv , perturbed clean examples xcln + δAP and perturbed adversarial examples
xadv + δAP . Adversarial perturbation bias can diversify the adversarial perturbations available to the
neural network using adversarial training. As a result, the diversity improves the testing accuracy on
both clean and adversarial examples (see Results).
5 EXPERIMENTS
5.1 DATASET AND NETWORK STRUCTURE
MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998) is a dataset with handwritten digits, has a training set of 60,000 examples,
and a test set of 10,000 examples. FashionMnist (Xiao et al., 2017) is a dataset with article images,
has a training set of 60,000 examples, and a test set of 10,000 examples. We use a LeNet (LeCun
et al., 1998) as a classifier (classical LeNet). Then, we create our version of LeNet (LeNet with
adversarial perturbation bias) by adding adversarial perturbation bias into the fully connected layers,
replacing the normal bias. We generate the adversarial examples using Fast Gradient Sign Method
for both classical LeNet and LeNet with adversarial perturbation bias.
5.2 QUANTITATIVE RESULTS
We test the LeNet with adversarial perturbation bias and classical LeNet on both clean and adversarial
examples from MNIST and FashionMNIST dataset, under 3 different computation budgets: Negligible
costs (Training only on clean examples), moderate extra costs (Training only on adversarial examples)
and high extra costs (Training on both clean and adversarial examples).
Negligible cost - training only on clean examples: our method can largely increase test accu-
racy on adversarial examples and slightly increase test accuracy on clean examples. When the
neural network can only be trained on clean examples because of modest computation power, LeNet
with adversarial perturbation bias achieves a slightly higher test accuracy on clean examples than
classical Lenet (Fig. 2B MNIST: 99.17% vs. 99.01%, FashionMNIST: 89.54% vs. 89.17%). In
addition, for the test accuracy on adversarial examples (Fig. 2A), classical Lenet can only achieve
18.08% on the MNIST dataset and 11.87% on the FashionMNIST dataset. In comparison, LeNet
with adversarial perturbation bias can achieve 98.88% on the MNIST dataset and 53.88% on the
FashionMNIST dataset. Thus, for companies with modest computation resources, adversarial pertur-
bation bias can help a system achieve moderate robustness against adversarial examples, while only
introducing negligible computation costs (e.g., on FashionMNIST, our method only uses 59% training
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Figure 2: Performance of LeNet with adversarial perturbation bias (our method) versus classical
network LeNet under three different computation power budgets for three different scenarios. The
adversarial examples are generated using FGSM ( = 0.3). 1. Negligible costs scenario (A,
B): training neural network only on clean examples. LeNet with adversarial perturbation bias
demonstrates much increased test accuracy on adversarial examples, and slightly increased test
accuracy on clean examples compared to classical LeNet. 2. Moderate extra costs scenario (C, D):
training neural network only on adversarial examples. LeNet with adversarial perturbation bias
demonstrates largely increased test accuracy on clean examples and slightly increased test accuracy
on adversarial examples compared to classical LeNet. 3. High extra costs scenario (E, F): training the
neural network on both clean and adversarial examples. LeNet with adversarial perturbation bias
demonstrates slightly increased test accuracy on both clean and adversarial examples compared to
classical LeNet.
time compared to the training time of adversarial training with just one adversarial example per
clean example, saving 43.51 minutes training time for 500 training epochs on NVIDIA Tesla-V100
platform. The saving would be huge on a larger dataset such as Imagenet (Deng et al., 2009)).
Moderate extra costs - training only on adversarial examples: our method can slightly increase
the test accuracy on adversarial examples and largely increase the test accuracy on clean ex-
amples. In the generation of adversarial examples, it takes multiple gradient computation through
backpropagation to calculate adversarial perturbations. As a consequence, training only on adversarial
examples is slightly more expensive than training only on clean examples. On classical networks,
although training only on adversarial examples can achieve a high test accuracy on adversarial exam-
ples (Fig. 2C classical LeNet: MNIST 99.01%, FashionMNIST 91.49%), it hurts the test accuracy
on clean examples. For example, for classical LeNet, training on clean examples can achieve test
accuracy - 99.01% for the MNIST dataset and 89.17% for the FashionMNIST dataset (Fig. 2B). For
classical LeNet, training on the adversarial examples can only achieve a much worse testing accuracy
- 95.54% for MNIST dataset and 65.64% for FashionMNIST dataset (Fig. 2D). In comparison,
for LeNet with adversarial perturbation bias, training on the adversarial examples can achieve a
testing accuracy - 97.72% for MNIST dataset and 71.54% for FashionMNIST dataset (Fig. 2D). This
accuracy is still worse than the accuracy of training only on clean examples, but it is much better
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than the accuracy of classical LeNet training only on adversarial examples. Thus, for companies with
moderate computation resources, we build a strong robust system against adversarial examples while
achieving a better testing accuracy on clean examples.
High extra costs - training on both clean and adversarial examples: our method can diversify
the adversarial perturbations, so it can slightly increase the test accuracy on both clean and
adversarial examples. LeNet with adversarial perturbation bias can achieve slightly higher accuracy
on clean examples than classical Lenet (Fig. 2F MNIST 99.13% vs. 99.09%, FashionMNIST 89.65%
vs. 89.49%). In addition, LeNet with adversarial perturbation bias can achieve slightly higher accuracy
on adversarial examples than classical LeNet (Fig. 2E MNIST 97.62% vs. 97.01%, FashionMNIST
95.39% vs. 94.98%). Even for companies with abundant computation resources, it is still helpful to
adapt our adversarial perturbation bias because it diversifies the adversarial perturbations.
5.3 INFLUENCE OF THE ADVERSARIAL PERTURBATION BUDGETS AND STRUCTURE OF
ADVERSARIAL PERTURBATION BIAS
Adversarial perturbation budgets: The higher the adversarial perturbation budgets, the higher
the chance it can successfully attack a neural network. However, attacks with higher adversarial
perturbation budgets are easier to detect by a program or by humans. For example,  = 0.3 (Fig. 1a)
represents very high noise, which makes FashionMNIST images difficult to classify, even by humans.
But the distribution differences between the adversarial examples and clean examples are so large that
they can be easily captured by defense programs. Thus,  ≤ 0.15 is a good attack since the differences
caused by adversarial perturbations are too small to be detected by most defense programs. For small
adversarial perturbations (Fig. 3a  ≤ 0.15), by just training on clean images, LeNet with adversarial
perturbation bias achieves moderate robustness against adversarial examples with negligible costs.
Thus, it is really beneficial to adapt our method for companies with modest computation power, who
still want to achieve moderate robustness against adversarial examples. Structure of adversarial
perturbation bias: under the FGSM attacks ( = 0.3, Fig. 3b), multimodal adversarial perturbation
bias works better than naive perturbation bias on MNIST. However, naive adversarial perturbation
bias works better than multimodal perturbation bias on FashionMNIST. Thus, the structure of
adversarial perturbation bias is a hyperparameter for different datasets. The number of bias memories
of multimodal adversarial perturbation bias is another hyperparameter. If we have insufficient bias
memories, there is not enough degrees of freedom to learn a good multimodal distribution. If we have
excessive bias memories, the model overfits the multimodal distribution.
Figure 3: Test accuracy on adversarial examples after training only on clean examples from MNIST
(Blue) or FashionMNIST (Orange) datasets. (a): Influence of different adversarial perturbation
budgets () on LeNet with adversarial perturbation bias. (b): Influence of different structures of
adversarial perturbation bias on LeNet under adversarial attack: FGSM  = 0.3.
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6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a new method to solve the three major practical difficulties while imple-
menting and deploying adversarial training, by embedding adversarial perturbation into the parameter
space (adversarial perturbation bias) of neural network. There are three major contributions that
benefit for companies with different levels of computation resources - 1. Modest Computation
power: adversarial training with negligible costs. 2. Moderate computation power: alleviate the
accuracy trade-off between clean examples and adversarial examples. 3. Abundant computation
power: diversify the adversarial perturbations available to the adversarial training.
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